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THE LIMITS OF BEHAVIORAL THEORIES OF LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 
Robert E. Scott*
INTRODUCTION
The law influences the behavior of its citizens in various ways.  Well understood are the
direct effects of legal rules.  By imposing sanctions or granting subsidies, the law either expands
or contracts the horizon of opportunities within which individuals can satisfy their preferences.  In
this way, society can give incentives for desirable behavior.  The direct effects of legal rules on
individual behavior have been a fruitful source of inquiry for analysts using the techniques of law
and economics.  Modeling the incentive effects of legal rules provides a useful predictive tool for
positive theory and normative critique.  Indeed, the tools of economics are well-suited to analyzing
variables--such as legal rules-- that stimulate changes in the costs of certain behaviors.
In recent years, the social norms literature has shown that law can also have indirect
effects on incentives.1  Thus, for example, a legal ban on smoking in public places or a “pooper-
scooper” law can motivate citizens not to smoke in certain areas or to clean up after their dogs
even where the state has no resources invested in direct (or first order) enforcement.  By
empowering neighbors and other citizens to use public ridicule as an enforcement technique, these
Revised August 17, 2000
2  Richard McAdams has developed the most comprehensive theory to explain the origin and regulation of
norms using the concept of competition for esteem (and the avoidance of disapproval). There is considerable
empirical evidence to support the notion that peer disapproval is an effective sanction against disfavored behavior. 
See, e.g., Herbert Jacob, Deterrent effects of Formal and Informal Sanctions in Policy Implementation 69 (1980);
Donna Bishop, Legal and Extra-legal Barriers to Delinquency: A Panel Analysis, Criminology (1984).
3 The three different potential sources of legal sanction have ben recognized by sociologists and social
psychologists.  See, Dennis H. Wrong, The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology, 26 Am.
Soc. Rev. 183 (1961); Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 44-45 (1990).  Paul Robinson and John Darley
have made a similar point as well.  Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev.
453 (1997)
4 Rational choice theory is the branch of economics which studies how an individual decisionmaker
chooses between competing alternatives.  Traditional rational choice theory usually assumes that an individual’s
preferences are consistent over time, and even those traditional models that incorporate changing preferences do
not account for strategic manipulation of one’s future alternatives.  Economists and other scholars have recently
developed a theoretical structure to analyze individual’s attempts to control or modify their choices through
precommitment or self-command.  This theory describes how individuals limit or manage their future behavior to
ensure that they not compromise their commitment to a present decision.  See, e.g., Thomas Schelling, Ethics,
Law and the Exercise of Self-Command, in Choice and Consequences 83 (1984); Thomas Schelling, Self-
Command in Practice, Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice, 74 Am Econ. Rev. 1 (1984); Richard H.
Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. Econ. Behav. 7 Org. 39 (1980); Richard H. Thaler
and Hersh M. Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-Control, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 392 (1981).
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laws can influence behavior by imposing informal (or second order) sanctions, such as shaming.2 
Similarly, these laws can have self-sanctioning (or third order) effects to the extent that citizens
internalize the legal rule and are deterred by the prospect of guilt.3  These latter effects require that
legal rules be mediated through social phenomena--social norms and human emotions-- that are
highly complex and only imperfectly understood.  In the case of a shaming sanction, the law must
rely on existing normative structures to influence in predictable ways the “expression” or social
meaning of the disfavored (or favored) action.  In the case of self-sanctions, the law must rely on
the even more complex phenomenon of internalization of normative behavior.
One way to understand these indirect effects is through the same rational choice lens that
has proven tractable in studying the direct effects of legal rules.4  Thus, the analyst might continue
to treat values, moral character and preferences as exogenous, not because these phenomena are
unimportant, but because her analytical tools don’t allow her to say anything systematic about
them.  This “parsimonious” approach would begin with the assumption that law has no systematic
influence on behavior except in how it affects the costs of that behavior, either directly through
Revised August 17, 2000
5 For an interesting discussion of the effect of law on endogenous preferences in the criminal law, see
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990
Duke Law J. 1. 
6  As one economist has observed:
To enter the field of taste changes one ought to find danger exhilarating.  The perils are
extreme... .The very ground threatens to fall away at one’s feet.  The economist, as policy advisor,
is supposed to seek efficiency, but whether a given policy is efficient depends upon the
preferences of those affected, and those preferences may depend in turn on efficiency.... Most
alarming of all, one risks discovering that true progress in this field means entering long-
forbidden territory; exploring the structures of human contentment from the inside and becoming
full and active partners with ‘behavioral scientists’, unrigorous as they may be....” T. A. Marschak,
On the Study of Taste Changing Policies, 68 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 386 (1978).
7 See text accompanying notes -- to -- infra.
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legal sanctions or indirectly by stimulating social sanctions associated with that behavior. 
 
Of course, no one believes that the only way that the state ever influences the behavior of
its citizens is through the incentive effects of legal rules.  Quite clearly, the state sometimes
influences behavior by shaping preferences rather than by constraining opportunities.5  An analyst
who wishes to understand how law predictably can influence behavior by changing a person’s
taste for engaging in a desired (or disfavored) action must treat preferences and values as
endogenous.  For post-modern legal scholars this is a straightforward move.  If the goal of the
analyst is to illustrate the social construction of behavior and preferences in particular contexts
and to eschew abstraction, prediction and generalization, then the familiar tools of social theory
and sociological description offer a rich story of the human experience.  But for the law-and-
economics analyst the invitation to treat preferences and values as endogenous is heady stuff.6
 Despite the perils, legal scholars and economists continue to explore the internal
mechanisms of social norms and of human emotions and to suggest predictive tools that may be
capable of accounting for the influences of legal rules on social norms and individual values.7  In
this essay, I ask the evaluative question:  How far have we come?  Clearly, as a descriptive
matter, we have come a long way.  From sociology we have learned about the existence of social
norms, an alternative, complex regime of social control that interacts with law in many different
Revised August 17, 2000
8 Moreover, we have some insights into both the relationship and differences between law and norms. 
Legal rules and social norms are overlapping, independent influences on human behavior.  At the broadest level of
generality, legal rules and social norms are complements as well as substitutes.  Thus, disfavored behavior
constrained by norms may not require additional legal sanction.  Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as
Relational Contract, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1225, 12-- (1998); Robert. E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term
Contracts, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 2005 (1987); McAdams, The Origin of Norms, supra note -- at 347-348. 
 There are also important differences between law and norms.  Law compels by direct coercion; norms
compel by shame and shunning.  The threat of isolation from one’s peers is the key to the potency of enforcement. 
The meaning of law is precise, the meaning of norms is fuzzy. See e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley,
Justice, Liability and Blame, 16, 65 (1995).  Obviously, the same principle implies that sometimes law and norms
function antagonistically.  See, for example, the code of silence among certain professional groups that
undermines legal requirements that illegal activity be reported.  Richard N. Pearson, The Role of Custom in
Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 Ind. L. J. 528 (1976).
9 Thus, for example, individuals do not eat in response to a rational calculus of caloric need.  Instead, a
complex set of forces cause one to “feel hungry.” Robert H. Frank, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of
the Emotions 51-56 (1988). 
10 Robert Frank argues that moral behavior has its source in the emotions rather than in “rationality” and
reason. Id at ----. 
 Beyond the strategic role of endogenous values and preferences, we have learned from cognitive and
social psychology that there are systematic “errors” in human judgment and decisionmaking reflected in the
deviation between empirically observed behavior and the predictions of rational choice models of behavior under
conditions of uncertainty.  Best known to legal scholars is the “prospect theory” developed by Daniel Kahneman
and Amos Tversky.  See Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases ( D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A.
Tversky eds. 1982).  More recently, the normative underpinnings of this research have been challenged by new
studies that show that framing bias by researchers may account for many of the observed “errors” in human
judgment. Thus, behavior that once might have been crudely characterized as reflecting cognitive errors or biases
is better understood as human tendencies to use adaptive rules of thumb or “smart heuristics” that order human
decision making around frequencies rather than probabilities. See generally, Gird Gigerenzer, Simple Heuristics
That Make Us Smart (1999) and text and accompanying notes --to-- infra.
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ways.8  From psychology, we have learned something about the relationship between external law
and internal values and emotions.  We know that external, material incentives are not the only
force that governs behavior.  Indeed, much of our behavior is stimulated by complex psychological
reward mechanisms.9  Moreover, evolutionary psychology teaches us that there is long term
advantage in moral behavior.  Salient emotional reactions--such as guilt, anger or empathy-- mark
one as a “cooperator” who is able to make credible commitments concerning her future actions.10
But when it comes to using this more textured understanding of human experience to
improve our ability to predict the effects of legal rules, the verdict is far less clear.  In the first
place, the academic debate currently suffers from conceptual pluralism and terminological
Revised August 17, 2000
11 Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 147 (1991) (quoting Arthur
Leff). 
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disarray.  Indeed, we lack even a basic consensus on the proper definition of a social norm.  This
tower of Babel quality is, in part, a reflection of the complexity of the social phenomena that we
are seeking to understand.  In part, it reflects the absence of a unified methodological and
conceptual apparatus.  The danger in such an environment is that the analyst will be guided more
by the strength of her a priori beliefs in the relative efficacy of government intervention than in the
analytical tools that are deployed.  In short, the dilemma remains no different from when it was
first identified by Arthur Leff a generation ago.  Law-and-economics, Leff said, “is a desert,” and
law-and-society (read: sociology and psychology) “is a swamp.”11  For twenty-five years legal
scholars have searched for the holy grail, the fertile middle ground between economics and the
other behavioral sciences.  The search may be noble and important, but the end of the journey is
not yet in sight.
The Essay proceeds as follows.  In Part I, I set out a contextual case study as an archetypal
environment for analyzing the interactions of law and norms.  Part II evaluates both the direct and
indirect effects of law within this contextual framework using the techniques of rational choice
theory.  In Part III, I relax the assumption that preferences are exogenous in order to examine, in the
same context, the explanatory power of the emerging expressive and internalization theories of
law.  I conclude, in Part IV, that a preference-shaping analysis provides a richer explanation for
commonly observed interactions among legal rules, norms and values, but at a considerable price. 
The introduction of non-falsifiable hypotheses produces an analysis that is rich in content but also
speculative and context-dependent.
Revised August 17, 2000
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I.  LAW AND NORMS IN CONTEXT
One way ( if not the best way) to analyze competing theories of the interactions of law,
norms and values is to test them in a specific real-world context.  What follows is one such
example, one which I describe with enough context to support an analysis of the complex
interrelationships among overlapping normative structures, individual preferences and values, and
legal regulation.
The Case of the Devoted Dog Lovers
Bill and Ann Smith are University professors who have a summer home in Maine where
they vacation with their four dogs.  Upon returning to Maine this past summer, the Smiths took their
smallest and most obedient dog out for a walk on a three-mile nature trail that they had previously
enjoyed.  Upon arriving at the trail head, the Smiths discovered to their dismay that the local
“greens” had succeeded in having the township enact an ordinance banning all dogs, leashed or
not, from the trail. The ordinance was marked with a large sign with a red line through a figure of a
dog, followed by the terms of the ordinance.  No sanction was specified, and, as long time summer
residents, they knew that the township had no effective constabulary.
The Smiths engaged in a moral debate.  They concluded that their principled commitment to
animal rights trumped their environmental sensibilities and also their strong inclination to obey the
law and, thus, they proceeded on the trail.  Shortly thereafter, the Smiths encountered a neighbor on
the trail, one with whom they had enjoyed friendly relations in the past.  In calm but insistent terms,
the neighbor chastised them for violating the ordinance and challenged them to admit that they had
seen and ignored it.  Shamed by the incident they returned home and, in subsequent trips, left the
dogs at home.
To this day, the Smiths remain convinced that the ordinance is wrong-headed and equally
agreed that, owing to the encounter, they will obey the ordinance in the future.  When asked
recently if they would stop taking the dog on the trail if, instead of an ordinance, there had been a
Revised August 17, 2000
12 The relevance of this question is to test the plausibility of claims that legal rules can have expressive
effects that are conceptually independent of any legal sanction.  See text accompanying notes-- to--infra.
13 See e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2181 (1996);
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. (1996); Robert Cooter, Models of Morality in Law and
Economics: Self-Control and Self-Improvement for the “Bad Man” of Holmes, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 903 (1998).
14 The relationship between normative standards and normative behavior remains uncertain.  Generally,
social psychologists assume that normative standards are triggered by paradigmatic situations.  Once “activated”,
these standards then mediate individual normative behavior.  See Leonard Berkowitz, Social Norms, Feelings and
Other Factors Affecting Helping and Altruism, 6 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 63 (Leonard
Berkowitz ed., 1972); Melvin J. Lerner, The Justice Motive: Some Hypotheses as to Its Origins and Forms, 45 J.
Personality 1 (1977); Leventhal, The Distribution of Rewards and Resources in Groups and Organizations, 9
Advances in Experimental Soc. Psychology 91 (Leonard Berkowitz & Elaine Walster, eds., 1976); June Price
Tangney, Recent Advances in the Empirical Study of Shame and Guilt, 38 Am. Behav. Scientist 1132 (1995); 
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public announcement from the township that nature lovers with dogs could avoid unpleasant
interactions by choosing another trail, the Smiths claimed that such an announcement would not
have deterred them.12  Why not?  “Because,” they stated, “then we would have a right to go on the
trail.”  But, if that is so, weren’t they wrong to venture down the path in the first place?  “No,” they
replied (firmly).  “We believed that animal rights were a trumping value.”  Then why did they stop
using the trail?  “Because we wished to avoid the ‘green police.’” But wouldn’t the “green police”
create an unpleasant encounter in the case of the public announcement?  “So what,” they
concluded.  The neighbors would then have had no right to shame them and, under these conditions,
the Smiths would be perfectly willing to defend themselves (and their dogs) even if the
interactions were uncomfortable.
The Complexity of Normative Constraints
Norms scholars commonly analyze situations such as this one by isolating one or two
normative constraints that influence the relevant behavior, and then speculating about the ways in
which those norms have been created, modified or enhanced by legal rules.13  Such analyses fail to
appreciate the deep complexity of the normative structure that influences behavior even in simple
contexts such as the Case of the Devoted Dog Lovers.  The messy reality of norms--though often
ignored by legal scholars -- is well understood by sociologists, social psychologists and cultural
anthropologists.14  At the outset, definitional clarity requires that we distinguish between
Revised August 17, 2000
15 To be sure, the distinction between conventions and norms is fuzzy.  Often conventions, such as table
manners, become normative over time in the sense that deviation is subject to social sanctions and, in turn, creates
a felt obligation to obey.  
16 See Jon Elster, The Cement of Society 101-02 (1989); McAdams, The Origin of Norms, supra note --
at 350-351; Robert Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643, 1656 (1996).
17 See Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. Legal Stud.
765 (1998) (presenting a signaling theory of norms); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax
Compliance, 86 Va. L. Rev -- (2000) (same); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (2000)(same).
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conventions--behavioral regularities that are commonly observed, such as serving dessert after
dinner and not before-- and norms, which are behavioral regularities that create an obligation to
obey.15  In our case, for example, the Smiths determination to observe the rule against dogs on the
trail is normative, supported as it is by a threat of sanction that, in turn, creates a felt obligation to
obey.  That obligation may come either from an internalized sense of duty or from a fear of external
sanctions such as shaming or shunning or from both.16 
Beyond the distinction between norms and conventions, and the different ways in which
norms are enforced, there is the further complication that an individual perceives any given norm
in two quite different senses.  The first is what the actor believes that she will do and the second is
what the actor believes that others will do.  The experimental literature on preference formation
and the cognitive psychology literature both suggest that while these two senses influence one
another, they are also distinct.  This distinction is relevant when the analyst seeks to answer the
key question: Why do people enforce norms against other people? In my example, what explains
the behavior of the neighbors?  
 One answer is that such “second order” enforcement is a signal to others of the
individual’s role as a member of that particular norm community.17  On this view, the neighbors
may be enforcing a norm to avoid the disapproval of other members of the norm community.  
Alternatively, the belief that the individual will obey while others will not may stimulate a
secondary norm that makes enforcement a norm itself.  On this view, the neighbors may have
internalized a norm that obliges them to enforce through shaming those norms to which they
Revised August 17, 2000
18 A theory of secondary norms relies, in one way or another on a theory of internalization.  The two most
prominent economic analyses of internalized norms are those by Robert Cooter and Gary Becker.  See generally,
Robert Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note -- at ---; Robert Cooter, Models of Morality in Law and
Economics: Self-Control and Self-Improvement for the “Bad Man” of Holmes, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 903 ( 1998);
Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. Legal Stud. 585 (1998); Gary S. Becker, Accounting for
Tastes (1996).  
19 This is not to say that models that simplify normative behavior into binary categories are not useful on
their own terms.  Thus, for example, Eric Posner’s attempt to develop a signaling model of norms that separates
individuals into two categories: “good types” and “bad types” provides useful insights into a variety of puzzling
behaviors such as tax compliance.  But the simplifications of the model also reveal how little of the relevant
behavior can be predicted in those terms.  See generally, Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax
Compliance, 86 Va. L. Rev. -- (2000).
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themselves adhere.18  Clearly, the correct answer to this question turns on the complex relationship
between internalization of a norm and the imposition of second order sanctions --such as shunning
or shaming.  
The analysis becomes even more complex when a simplifying assumption, one rarely
acknowledged by legal norms scholars, is relaxed.  Normative behavior is multifaceted and not
binary.  Behavior is not constrained by one or two norms, nor is an individual either a norm
“cooperator” or not.19  Thus, to try even a simple taxonomy of norms necessary to analyze the Case
of the Devoted Dog Lovers risks distortion and oversimplification.  In the case of the Smiths, for
example, they describe themselves as having the following (relevant) preferences and values. 
First, they have a deeply imbedded respect for law and legal institutions that is the product of their
roles as members of the “informed elite.”  Second, they both have a strong “moral sensibility”and
a commitment to act on their moral principles that are products of many factors, including their
education, age, experiences and associations.  Third, they share a strongly held preference for
preserving the environment that is linked to their self-identification as “liberal Democrats” and
lovers of nature.  And fourth, both the Smiths claim an even stronger preference for promoting the
welfare of animals as exemplified by their devotion to their dogs.  
 
Even at this simplified level, it is obvious that normative constraints are not
complementary but frequently are in tension.  To be sure, the Smiths have an embedded hierarchy
of values that permits them to resolve value conflict.  But until the conflict is presented to them,
Revised August 17, 2000
20 Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 Va. L. Rev.-- (2000).
21 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies (1995).
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they are not able to articulate that hierarchy with any confidence.  Not until the incident on the trail
did the Smiths fully realize that, in their moral calculus, “dogs trump trees.” In sum, for the Smiths,
as for all of us, normative constraints are “soft.”  We adhere to most but not all, most of the time.
We experience norm confusion when constraints overlap.  Some norms are tied or “bundled” to
each other, even though they may appear to have (and do have) separate spheres of influence for
others.  Finally, individuals practice what Elizabeth Scott has called “preference disguise.”20  We
are often unwilling to express intrinsic preferences, especially when to do so risks the imposition
of sanctions by other members of our norm community who don’t have precisely the same
preference structure.21 
The human tendency to mask those preferences that are inconsistent with the prevailing
norms complicates any predictions about how and when a particular norm is internalized.  In the
case of the Smiths, therefore, an objective analyst must begin by accepting their stated preferences
and values as given.  Moreover, as one who is a longtime close personal friend and intimate, my
observation that these preferences are deeply internalized (putting aside for the moment how and
why that process occurs) has been tested against numerous experiences, including instances where
value conflicts require a more candid revelation of “true” preferences.  This leaves us, then, with
the core question.  Given four internalized norms:  a respect for law, a strong moral sense, a
commitment to the environment and an even deeper commitment to animal rights, how can we
understand the effects of the legal ordinance banning dogs on the nature trail?
Revised August 17, 2000
22  Rational choice theory is premised on the assumption that individuals rationally choose among
available opportunities to achieve maximum satisfaction according to their individual preferences.  Individual
choice is thus a product of two functions: the individual’s “opportunity set” which specifies the set of all feasible
opportunities from which choices can be made, and a “utility function” which specifies the ranking of those
opportunities according to the individual’s  tastes or preferences. The traditional assumption is that an individual
chooses among these preferences rationally, that is, preferences are complete, reflexive and transitive.  Thus,
according to the model,  an individual chooses the opportunity that produces the most utility given her preferences. 
The traditional assumption is that choices can only be manipulated or influenced by acts that expand or contract the
opportunity set, such as by granting subsidies or imposing sanctions.  Thus, under the traditional assumptions of
rational choice analysis,  only changes in the  opportunity set are modeled.  For purposes of the analysis, it is
assumed that individual preferences are exogenous or immutable.  See Hal R. Varian,  Microeconomic Analysis
112-120 (3rd ed. 1992).
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II.  A RATIONAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND 
NORMS
The Case of the Devoted Dog Lovers presents us with a law that carries no formal legal
sanction or threat of sanction.  But it influences behavior.  Is that influence due to either the
expressive or internalization effects of the law?  A rational choice analyst would answer, “not
necessarily.”  By focusing on the incentive effects of law in shaping the opportunity set of the
Smiths and their neighbors, we can develop a plausible story to explain the case using the classic
tools of rational choice. 22
Preferences and Norms as Part of the External Environment
Assume first that all preferences and normative behavior of the Smiths and their neighbors
are exogenous and that the only relevant variables that influence the behaviors of the actors in
predictable ways are changes in the costs and benefits of satisfying those preferences.  By
hypothesis, therefore, the new dog ordinance influences behavior (if at all) by granting a subsidy to
enforcers who, in turn, impose an expected sanction on violators. 
On this account, the neighbors are motivated by the legal rule to enforce a local norm that
prefers trees to dogs.  The incentives for the neighbors to publicly affirm their preference for trees
Revised August 17, 2000
23 In rational choice terms, the neighbors are motivated to express their preference for trees to dogs by
shaming violators when (and only when) the returns to shaming exceed their costs.  There is a plausible story to
explain when that might be so.  See note 28 infra.
24 Without the ordinance, dog lovers might mistake the amount of community support for dogs over trees
and thus persuade themselves that their neighbors disapproval reflects idiosyncratic preferences, a conclusion that
the neighbors might share as well.  Thus, the primary significance of the ordinance is that it carries information
about the preferences of others in the community.  This argument assumes implicitly that the local political
process reflects majoritarian values.  This may not always hold true.  If legislation sometimes reflects successful
rent seeking by interest groups, and this special interest bias is well-known, then people won’t infer anything
necessarily from the enactment of the ordinance.  It also implies that, to the extent that preferences change faster
than legislation, a recently-enacted ordinance may have more information value than an old one.
25 I recognize that Richard McAdams calls these second-order sanctions an “expressive” effect.  See
McAdams, What is Expressive Law?, 86 Va. L. Rev. -- (2000).  To the extent that he is focusing on the
informational effects of the law and not on any changes in normative behavior that are caused by the law our debate
is primarily semantic. But if McAdams is assuming that the law causes normative change through its expressive
effect, then our differences are more fundamental.
26 I am grateful to Paul Mahoney for recognizing the importance of making this point explicitly.
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to dogs have been altered by the enactment of the ordinance.23 This is true to the extent that the
neighbors and other norm supporters are playing something like an assurance game in which the
neighbors are more willing to sanction violators the more they believe others are willing to
sanction.  An increase in the number of potential norm enforcers reduces the expected costs of
conflict for any single enforcer and, in turn, increases the reputational returns to being in the class
of enforcers.  The norm is enforced by a second order sanction--shaming.  The effect of the
sanction is to make the Smiths’ preference for vindicating the rights of their dogs more costly to
express than previously.  
In this view, the effect of the law is to teach the community about the general local
sentiment regarding the conflict between dogs and trees.24  This, in turn, emboldens the neighbors
to speak out.  To be sure, one might characterize this “broadcasting” effect of the local ordinance
as “an expressive” function of the law. On one level, then, the question becomes largely one of
semantics.25 But on a deeper level, there is a fundamental difference between a rational choice
analysis of these second order sanctions and an “expressive” analysis.26 The important point is
this:  As the Case of the Devoted Dog Lovers illustrates, we observe, as an empirical regularity,
Revised August 17, 2000
27 The ordinance embodies a further piece of information for the Smiths.  It tells them that the character
of any conflict interaction on the trail has now been altered.  Those inclined to enforce the norm will now have an
argument that they lacked previously: as a matter of positive law, the Smiths no longer have the right to bring their
dogs.  While the Smiths can resort to claims of civil disobedience, the range of justifications for their actions has
been narrowed.
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that people obey the law most of the time even when the threat of state-imposed punishment is
remote.  It is common ground that part of the explanation is that individuals may experience
informal sanctions imposed by other members of the community.  The key question is what is the
relationship between the law itself and the informal sanctioning behavior? 
As I describe in more detail in Part III, an “expressive” theorist would argue that the law
changes things; that by expressing the sentiment of the community, the ordinance modifies or
stimulates the creation of an underlying norm in some way.  But a rational choice theorist offers an
alternative explanation in which the law “expresses” something only in a Bayesian sense.  Prior to
the anti-dog ordinance, the Smiths might have estimated the probability that someone would
chastise them for bringing dogs on the trail as, say, 1 in 10.  Once they see the sign informing them
about the ordinance, they will revise their estimate to, perhaps, 1 in 6. Thereafter, once they
encounter their neighbors on the trail, they revise their estimate again, this time to, say, 1 in 2.  
Why might the Smiths revise their estimate of the probabilities of sanction without
experiencing a change in their preferences or in the underlying norms?  The Smiths, as all of us,
recognize that statutes are enacted only if (1) a substantial majority of the community has at least a
weak preference for the new rule, or (2) a minority of the community has an intense preference for
the new rule.  If a majority doesn’t want dogs on the trail, then by definition if the Smiths encounter
someone else on the trail, the other hikers are more likely than not to disapprove of the Smiths’
behavior.  Minorities with intense preferences tend to relish playing “norm entrepreneur” (or
“busybody” as norm entrepreneurs used to be known), so they are more likely than the average
person to be out on the trail looking for people to shame.  Knowing that one of these two things is
the case would cause the Smiths to revise their prior estimate of the likelihood of an unpleasant
encounter on the trail.27  
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A similar analysis applies to the neighbors.  The existence of the ordinance implies either
(1) that if the Smiths react aggressively to an attempt to shame them, other hikers on the trail are
likely to take the neighbors side, or (2) the Smiths’ (or any other dog walkers) preference is likely
to be less intense than the neighbors, so they are unlikely to react aggressively.  The important
point in this story is that the law does not communicate a moral message, alter preferences, or
anything else.  So far as the world of norms is concerned, the ordinance serves only an
informational function--it tells an affected citizen something about the likelihood of experiencing
informal sanctions. The effects of the law are simply explained in terms of changes in the
opportunities available to the Smiths and the neighbors respectively to satisfy a given set of
preferences.28
A similar story can be told about pooper-scooper laws or smoking bans in airports, the
favorite examples used by norms scholars to describe the expressive and internalization effects of
law.29  Pooper-scooper laws, even without effective enforcement by the state, change the
incentives of individuals facing a preference conflict between a taste for clean yards and a taste
for allowing “dogs to be dogs.”  No smoking ordinances in airports not only solve coordination
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problems but resolve a cooperation problem as well: the preferences of those who prefer clean air
to those who prefer to smoke.  The law in either case informs those with the preference that favors
clean air or clean yards that general local sentiment supports their preference.  This raises the
benefits and lowers the costs of shaming violators.  Similarly, the violator is informed of the
prospect of second order sanction and the costs of the forbidden activity are increased.
 The Case of the Devoted Dog Lovers thus shows why law qua law can be understood to
have predictable and independent effects beyond the threat of sanctions imposed directly by the
state.  These effects can be analyzed in terms of changes in the costs and benefits of particular
behaviors. On this account, the role of norms is to provide information to the actor about the
external environment.  Information is both valuable and costly, so rational choice theory would
predict that people would engage in investments to acquire norm-related information up to the
point where marginal return equals marginal cost.  Traditional theory would also observe that
norms have the characteristics of a public good, so public provision of norm-related information
through legal change has some advantages.30
This focus on the different ways law can shape the opportunity set of the relevant actors
provides a parsimonious and coherent account without recourse to the possibility that the law
might have expressive effects or might influence the social meaning of the behavior or might,
through internalization, induce changes in individual preferences.  Moreover, the rational choice
analyst using these tools can pursue insights into the interaction of law and norms and still be fully
aware that life is more complicated than the models she uses to explain it.
The Implications of Norms as Information
Now let’s assume that legal change not only influences behavior directly, but also, by
providing norm-related information, affects the individual’s perceptions of normative constraints
which, in turn, stimulates second order effects.  Several implications follow from an explicit
assumption that norms are part of the external environment.  Norms are ways of predicting how
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people will behave in response to certain social cues.  That knowledge allows those familiar with
the relevant norms to optimize their choices for any given set of normative and legal constraints.  It
follows, therefore, that the legal analyst will do better at predicting the effects of legal rules where
legal and normative incentives tend to run in the same direction.  Moreover, the overlapping
effects of law and norms argue for a more careful analysis of which influence --law or norms--has
the comparative advantage.  As Ellickson has reminded us, the legal analyst must guard against the
myth of legal centrism.31  The fact that law operates in conjunction with a robust, complex and
overlapping normative structure argues for a complementary role for state sanctions, permitting
cooperation problems to be resolved within existing normative frameworks where those
frameworks work best.32  The more we learn about norms, therefore, the more we should demand
evidence of the comparative inadequacy of these extralegal constraints on behavior before we
impose additional, legal constraints.
 Finally, the interaction of law and norms tells the analyst something about the relationship
between prices and sanctions.33  Sometimes, the effects of legal rules are amplified by an existing
normative constraint, making the law a sanction that deters the action.  Thus, for example, an
ordinance that limits parking in spaces reserved for the disabled is buttressed by the existing
social norm of respect for the disabled and makes a violation subject to condemnation.  On the
other hand, in the case of a mere parking meter violation, the existing norm describes the behavior
in neutral terms and thus the legal rule merely sets the price for parking in that space.
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But rational choice theory has its deficits as well.  Common experience supports Larry
Lessig’s insight that social meaning is both internally constructed and subject to change.34  Indeed,
without understanding the social meaning of a particular act, the analyst risks not prescribing the
right legal intervention to stimulate desired behavior.  Thus, for example, the social meaning of
graffiti on the New York subways was not fully understood as an invitation to antisocial and
criminal behavior until “broken windows policing” revealed the benefits of paying attention to the
social context of crime.35  In this case, the legal change--strictly enforcing the rules against
defacing public property-- appears to have had a powerful “expressive” effect in changing the
social meaning of the experience of riding the subway.  The evidence supports the hypothesis that
random crime and violence declined as a result of changes in the meaning of the social context. 
Unsurprisingly, the legal analyst yearns for a theory to explain when and how these “expressive”
effects might operate. 
Similarly, self-reflection (as well as inability to explain in rational choice terms behaviors
such as voting and tipping servers in roadside diners ) confirms the reality of internalization.  We
all experience guilt when we violate certain normative commands.  Moreover, guilt is only one
among a range of emotional responses that function as a pre-commitment to cooperative action.36  
If I feel guilt when I violate a promise, and there is some way of signaling that fact to others, then
my commitments to act in a cooperative way are credible.  These internal constraints on behavior
can be understood from the perspective of evolutionary psychology.  There is long-term advantage
in moral behavior.  But in order for emotions, such as guilt, to work as self-enforcing
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commitments, satisfaction must be intrinsic in the act of compliance and not premised on the
possibility that material gains may later follow.  Thus, as Robert Frank has argued, moral
sentiments do not lead to material advantage unless they are internalized.37  If the analyst could
unlock the keys to internalization, a far richer and more robust theory of human behavior under
constraints would be available to us.
  
In short, it is easy to understand why legal analysts seek to incorporate preference-shaping
factors, such as those that may result from the “expression” or “internalization” of a legal
command.  But what, exactly, do we know about legal expression and internalization?  In the next
Part, I analyze the Case of the Devoted Dog Lovers using the preference-shaping tools that norm
scholars have proposed we add to the legal analyst’s kit bag.
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III.  THE EXPRESSIVE AND INTERNALIZATION FUNCTIONS OF LAW
If we assume that people make choices among their opportunities (according to some
criterion of rationality) so as to achieve the most satisfaction given their preferences and values,
then it follows that individual behavior can be affected in two different ways.  Rather than focusing
on how changes in external constraints affect the actor’s range of opportunities, given stable
preferences and values, one can ask directly how external changes affect individuals preferences
and values.38  Treating preferences and normative behavior as endogenous permits the analyst to
deal with the effects of experiences and social forces.  The merit of this approach is obvious.  A
large number of social choices depend not only on opportunities but on past experiences and social
influences as well.  The challenge in any preference-shaping analysis is to retain the predictive
power of the traditional model of rational utility maximizing behavior while enriching the analysis
by offering a more complete account of the effects of changes in preferences  and values on
individual choice.39
Expressive and internalization theories of law and social norms seek to do just that.  While
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these two concepts are interrelated and overlapping, it is useful for analytical clarity to describe
them as occupying two separate domains.  The expressive effects of law are those consequences of
legal rules that stimulate changes in social norms and conventions and /or change the social (or
normative) meaning of particular behaviors. Ideally, by expressing a legal principle or standard,
the state can overcome the collective action constraint that is precluding private parties from
solving either a cooperation problem or a coordination problem or both.40  In turn, the emergence
of a new normative framework influences an actor’s preferences either directly, through
internalization, or indirectly through the imposition of second order social sanctions such as
shaming or ostracism. In sum, expressive theory focuses on the first question: what are the
mechanisms by which the social meaning of any action is shaped or modified?41  Internalization
theory, on the other hand, focuses on the further question: what are the mechanisms by which
preferences can be modified?
 Law as Expression.  
Expressive theories of law have been popularized in the work of Larry Lessig and Cass
Sunstein.42  While important in focusing scholarly attention on the issue, their work is illustrative
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rather than systematic.  Lessig shows through anecdotal, cross-cultural comparisons that the social
meaning of particular behaviors varies across time and cultures.43  A collective action problem
may prevent private parties from changing a disfavored social meaning by their individual actions. 
The state, however, if sensitive to social meaning, can stimulate desirable changes through legal
expression.  Thus, for example, anti-dueling statutes in the South were less effective than
prohibitions against a dueler’s holding public office because the bar on office holding made
ambiguous the social meaning of defending one’s honor in a duel.44
Sunstein extends Lessig’s analysis by asking how legal statements (which carry social
meaning as well as imposing sanctions) might be designed to create or modify social norms.   If
law can manipulate social meaning, then it follows that law can manipulate normative structures as
well.  Sunstein suggests that anti-littering statutes and pooper-scooper laws have such an
expressive effect.  Even without direct sanctions, such regulation inculcates appropriate behavior
among some citizens (internalization) and also inculcates the expectation of social opprobrium in
others (expression).  These changes in preferences and values occur because the social meaning of
littering or not cleaning up after one’s dog has been changed from the exercise of free choice to a
demonstration of disrespect for others.  A “norm cascade” is stimulated by the mere consequence
of changing preferences and behavior in some citizens, and, at some point, the behavior reaches a
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tipping point and a new norm is entrenched.45  
Richard McAdams’ esteem-based theory of norm creation and modification is the most
systematic effort to explain the mechanisms by which legal expression can affect social norms.46 
McAdams’ argument assumes that individuals seek the esteem and respect of others.  Moreover,
their desire for esteem is relative.  Because individuals want to enjoy more of a person’s good
opinion in comparison to others competing for the same levels of esteem, the withholding of
esteem is a sanction.  Moreover, the expression of such disapproval is relatively costless to the
enforcer and thus individuals readily assume the role of norm enforcer.47  McAdams explains the
conditions for norm creation or modification as arising from a consensus within a community of the
esteem-worthiness of a target behavior.  If, in addition, there is a risk of detection for deviation
from the consensus and there is a capacity to publicize the deviation--through gossip or other
informal or formal means--then a norm can arise (and/or be modified).  
The key element of publicity provides the link for McAdams to an expressive theory of
law.  Law can affect behavior through second order sanctioning by signaling the existence of a
consensus that is only dimly perceived by the members of the community or group before the legal
enactment. If the conditions are right, legal publicity can stimulate the creation and/or modification
of normative behavior that, in turn, will influence primary behavior through group expression of
disapproval.48 
Lessig, Sunstein and McAdams freely concede that the expressive effects of law are
dependent on circumstance.  Thus, legal pronouncements may or may not lead to normative change
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in any particular case.  Norm change turns on many highly context-specific factors, including
whether the existing norms are tied or bundled with other, desirable norms,49 whether a “silent
majority” exists for changing existing norms, and whether there are in place successful norm
entrepreneurs, individuals of extraordinary skill who perform the roles of “mavens” and
“connectors.50  Despite these limitations, it is fair to require, at a minimum, that, an expressive
analysis of legal change have descriptive, if not predictive, power. 
The Limits of Expressive Explanations of Legal Change
 Does law as expression enrich the analysis in the Case of the Devoted Dog Lovers? 
Under our facts, the Smiths do report that they were shamed by the intervention of their neighbors
on the trail.  An expressive analysis might proceed along the following lines.  The expressive
effect of the ordinance is the signal to the community that a clear norm consensus exists which
prefers trees to dogs.  Absent the ordinance, the existence of a consensus might have been
uncertain.  Now the Smiths, as law-abiders, are confronted with the prospect of being deviators,
and the neighbors, as norm enforcers, are reinforced in their predisposition to impose sanctions.
The expressive effects of the law stimulates a change in the expectations of both the Smiths and
their neighbors.  The Smiths now understand their behavior as constituting a normative violation. 
This altered expectation reshapes their prior preferences for dogs to trees.  Through a process as
yet imperfectly understood, the expectation of social sanctions stimulates a preference change and
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the new norm is internalized.51
An expressive analysis thus understands the Smiths behavior after the exchange on the trail
in terms of a change in endogenous preferences that was stimulated, in the first instance, by the
ordinance.  But a traditional rational choice analysis reached the identical point by focusing on
changes in incentives rather than expectations.  That analysis concluded that the incentive effects of
the ordinance were to increase the costs of walking the dog on the trail for the Smiths while
increasing the subsidy to those who were predisposed to exclude dogs.  What neither rational
choice theory nor expressive “theory” can answer, however, is whether the local ordinance
stimulated a change in social meaning and thus modified the existing norms or whether it simply
emboldened the neighbors because it revealed information about an existing norm.  In other words,
we simply do not know whether the willingness of the neighbors to impose social sanctions on the
Smiths was stimulated by normative change or not.52
In short, expressive “theory” standing alone cannot improve upon rational choice theory in
describing the effects of legal rules.  Moreover, unlike rational choice theory, the ideas about
expressive effects are not a theory or a model in the conventional sense of those concepts.  They
do not provide a method of analysis that generates testable predictions about the world. To be
sure, especially with McAdams’ refinements, the mechanisms for norm influence are described at
a level of abstraction that purports to permit generalization.  But the relationship among the key
variables is not adequately specified. 
 There is a good reason for this critical omission.  In point of fact, whether norms are
created or modified as a result of a legal rule is context-dependent, and, under the current state of
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our understanding, unknown.  In order to claim that a normative change is a causal consequence of
a legal rule, the analyst must begin with a baseline.  What is the state of the world before the legal
change?  In other words, when does a norm become a norm?  We do not know the answer to this
question because of the intractable problem of assessing social meaning in a world where private
preferences are often disguised.  The expressive analysis thus cannot answer the question whether
the law precedes or merely follows the creation of the norm. On one view, a norm already exists
and the law is simply reflecting the emerging norm.  On the other view, the conditions for
normative change are ripe and the law stimulates the creation of the new norm.  Which came first,
the chicken or the egg?  Without further, more rigorous, analyses, the verdict on the expressive
effects of law must remain: not proven.  The ideas are interesting, the question is important, but,
thus far, the observations are largely speculative.53
There have been several, additional attempts to systematize the idea that law can have
expressive consequences.  Richard McAdams, in this symposium, focuses on the state’s
comparative advantage in publicity and prominence that allows it to solve vexing coordination
problems (such as those facing smokers and non smokers in airports) through legal
pronouncements.54   In the version of his paper presented at this symposium, Robert Cooter
described the expressive effects of law as analogous to the economics of cheap talk.55  Cheap talk
is a statement that changes individuals expectations but not their incentives.  Cooter gives the
example of a public official making a believable public pronouncement that stimulates enough
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citizens to change their behavior such that a new and superior equilibrium emerges in which a
majority of the citizens adopt a new civic norm. 
 Neither the new McAdams paper nor the initial Cooter draft adds much to the preceding
analysis of expressive law.  In the case of coordination problems--such as driving on the right or
the left, or smoking only in designated areas-- it is not clear what the state can do, other than as
any property owner, to stimulate coordination solutions. To be sure, as several scholars have
argued, the law would seem to be a very effective source of focal points to the extent that it
reliably publicizes a latent consensus.56  The problem, however, is with the claim of reliability. 
At the level of the local community, a public announcement may well reliably reflect a local
consensus.  But at more removed levels of legislative or judicial action, the fact that law is
mediated through representative democracy precludes many judgments about whether the
consensus is latent or as yet undeveloped.   
 Similarly, it is unclear what advantage the state enjoys in creating a better civic
environment through speeches and other forms of public discourse.  In the main, through its legal
pronouncements the state solves (or purports to solve) cooperation problems that private parties
cannot easily solve themselves.  To do so, the state must order competing value choices.  Thus, for
example, in the Case of the Devoted Dog Lovers, the local ordinance decrees, in effect, that on the
nature trail “ trees trump dogs.”  Viewing the ordinance as the solution to a coordination problem
or as an appeal to a higher civic purpose ignores the reality that the ordinance creates a value
conflict in those who order moral choices differently from the duty as embodied in the new law. 
Their obedience does not derive either from adherence to convention or from cheap talk.  It
derives from law as sanction.
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 This is not to deny that an incidental effect of some laws is to solve a coordination
problem through the announcement or expression of a new convention or understanding that serves
as a focal point.  But, in this regard, there is nothing unique about law (independent of sanction). 
Conflict over smoking in airports can be (and in some places is) avoided by the airport announcing
separate smoking and nonsmoking areas.  Put simply, as distinct from civic discourse or public
pronouncements, law as cheap talk is a null set.  Law, by it’s very nature, is expensive talk.
Law as Internalization. 
The more interesting and provocative efforts to analyze endogenous preferences are those
that focus on the mechanism of internalization.  In Accounting for Tastes, Gary Becker seeks to
solve one of the key difficulties confronting the theorist who wishes to meld an analysis of
endogenous preferences with rational choice theory.57 The problem is that welfare economics
assesses the morality of any action (including a legal rule) in terms of its consequences as
determined by the preferences of those affected.  Thus, for example, a social state is deemed
pareto optimal if it would be impossible to make anyone better off without making at least one
other person worse off.  But as Sunstein has pointed out, “when preferences are functions of legal
rules, the rules cannot be justified by reference to the preferences.  Social rules and practices
cannot be justified by the practices that they have produced.”58
 To solve the problem of endogenous preferences undermining the welfare criterion of
utility maximization, Becker creates the concepts of personal capital and social capital (as
extensions of his concept of consumption capital in which individuals have stable second order
preferences about preferences).59  Personal capital consists of the sum of the individual’s personal
experiences over time.  Social capital is the sum of the individual’s social networks and past
experiences.  Together, these capital stocks constrain an individual’s choices.  Thus, the past casts
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a shadow over the present and, as individuals are forward looking, over the future as well. 
Preferences and values change as the capital stock changes over time, but individual choice is
consistent over time.  Forward looking rational actors maximize their utility from meta or second
order preferences and not from current preferences alone because they recognize that the choices
they make today will become part of their capital stock and thus will affect their future utilities and
preferences as well.60  
Becker’s theory purports to provide a foundation for analyzing the preference-shaping
effects of law.  If a legal change stimulates a change in preferences, that change becomes part of
the individual’s personal capital stock.  Alternatively, the legal change may influence how the
individual is treated by others.  This, in turn, would become part of her social capital.  In either
case, these two capital accumulations will affect both present and future choices consistently over
time. 
 
Becker’s analysis, though suggestive, does not answer the one central question necessary to
a complete theory of internalization:  can an individual affect his own preferences in the future by
self-motivated changes in his current preferences?  Robert Cooter has proposed just such a
mechanism in his concept of “pareto self improvement.”61  Cooter’s claim rests on the assumption
that an individual’s character is “translucent” at least to his intimates and close colleagues.  While
the state may not know whether an individual is a “cooperator” or a “defector,” basic moral values
are observable, albeit imperfectly, by friends, neighbors and co-workers.  Knowing that, an
individual with a defective moral character observes that she lacks the ability to solve ordinary
commitment problems in the absence of formal mechanisms like enforceable contracts.  Social
interactions depend on credible commitments that are self-enforcing.  Thus, our putative moral
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defective observes that she loses opportunities because she cannot make credible commitments. 
The motivation to increase her opportunity set stimulates the necessary characterological changes
in values.  Out of this process emerges a “new person.”  New and better preferences and values--
honesty, loyalty, trustworthiness--are now part of the individual’s stock of traits.  
Cooter posits that the state, aware of the possibility that individuals are motivated to make
pareto self-improvements, is able to stimulate desirable changes in group behavior.62  Since the
state is not in the same position as friends and colleagues to infer character from behavior, the
state must, in Cooter’s world, rely on intimate groups to instill civic virtue in each other.  What the
state can do, however, is to announce modifications or changes in civic responsibility.  Suppose,
for example, the state announces a legal rule that good citizens pick up litter in public places. 
Rather than attaching a direct sanction, or even relying on a second-order sanction such as
shaming, this law can have an internalization effect to the extent that behaving consistently with
civic responsibility is seen as a proxy for good moral character as a “cooperator.”  Some number
of citizens will, therefore, internalize the new norm as a pareto self-improvement.  Others will
obey the norm automatically because their respect for law causes them to obey the laws as an
intrinsic value.  Together these two effects can motivate a tipping point that will shift behavior to a
new equilibrium. 
A Critique of the Theory of Internalization
Cooter suggests three steps in the process by which law can change the preferences of
citizens through internalization: (1) align law with morality, (2) rely upon citizens’ respect for law
itself, and (3) depend upon self-motivated improvements to stimulate individual acts of civic
virtue. Can any of these factors predictably explain changes in behavior that are induced by legal
rules?  First, consider alignment of law with morality.  Cooter correctly states that when a
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particular law is aligned with morality, obedience to and effectiveness of the law will increase.63 
But here all (or certainly most) of the work is being done by the presumed existence of an
uncontroversial moral sentiment that the state is wise enough to elevate to a civic duty through law. 
None of the work is done by the law itself.  Take, for example, the more common case, such as our
“no dogs” ordinance, where the legal rule reflects conflicting moral claims.  Under these
conditions, a person who values dogs over trees will not change her belief in the morality of the
new law since, as to her, the law orders morality improperly.  If behavior changes, it is owing to
factors other than alignment.
What about the claim that respect for the law standing alone will stimulate increased
willingness to perform a civic duty once it is announced as a legal command?  This is, as Cooter
recognizes, a contestable empirical claim. 64  But even granting Cooter his assumption, he fails to
account for the force of a moral claim to civil disobedience.  In any well-ordered society, there is
an N of citizens who respect particular laws when the basic structure of law appears to be just. 
Once they respect law in general, they are predisposed to respect particular laws.  Thus, by
embodying an emerging norm in a particular law, the state may induce a superior equilibrium by
virtue of the general claim to obedience alone.  Sometimes this is so, but not always or even
predictably.  As in the Case of the Devoted Dog Lovers, whenever a legal change conflicts with a
particular moral claim, even those who habitually obey the law are confronted with a moral
choice.  Indeed, I would suggest that the greater the habitual respect for law, the greater the
commitment to civil disobedience as a moral principle.65  Mohandas Gandhi was a Cambridge-
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educated lawyer with a profound commitment to the principles of justice embodied in the English
legal system. Those principles drove him to disobey particular laws.  Less profoundly, the Smiths’
belief in the justice of their commitment to animal rights prompted them to disobey the ordinance
notwithstanding their internalized sense of respect for the law.  Only when they realized the
potency of the sanction did they reconsider their actions.
This leaves Cooter’s most creative (and controversial) idea-- “pareto self-improvement.” 
This is a provocative concept, but it suffers from three basic difficulties.  First, I quarrel with
Cooter’s assumptions, in particular the assumption that preferences are translucent, by which he
means that others, especially colleagues and associates, can observe, albeit imperfectly, the
content of one’s character.  The assumption that character can be reliably inferred from behavior is
inconsistent with common observation.  I would assert, to the contrary, that behavior is translucent
but preferences (or character) are opaque.  Preferences and character stem from motivation which,
as psychologists tell us, is peculiarly elusive. 
 There is a second problem with self-motivated preference change.  The claim that
observable behavior reflects preference change is, itself, non-falsifiable.  No plausible empirical
observation can distinguish between the two competing assumptions.  Thus, how can one
distinguish between adaptive mimicry behavior--a colleague who behaves as a cooperator in
order to expand his opportunity set, but who remains a self-absorbed defector at the core-- and a
true preference conversion where a formerly selfish individual is motivated by the prospect of
enhanced opportunity to internalize cooperative preferences? 
 A psychiatrist friend captured this insight with a comment that is apt for all those times that
acquaintances comment on the puzzling marriage of an apparent cooperator to an apparent
defector.  He says, “You get the spouse you deserve.”  The key to the observation is that it works
reciprocally:  appearances could be wrong in both directions.  It is another way of saying that
preferences are opaque except in marriage or other similarly intimate settings. 
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 In short, I know the revealed character of my colleagues, but I don’t know their character.
(And as long as their revealed character is consistent with institutional virtue, the distinction is
irrelevant to me and, in consequence, to their opportunity set.)  The Smiths in my example are
perhaps our dearest friends.  I have known them for almost twenty-five years.  But if they had told
me that they had decided at the outset to obey the dog ordinance because they had reordered their
preferences between trees and dogs, I would have no way of knowing whether that was true or
whether they wanted me to believe that it was true.  Behavior is observable.  Character is not. 
And until we have a means of looking inside the human soul, we can only make predictions based
on what we can observe.66   
Finally, the concept of self-motivated preference change within a framework of rational
choice theory is internally incoherent.  A pareto self-improvement, by definition, is a self-
motivated change in the individual’s discount rate.  It assumes that an individual can rationally
choose to expand her opportunity set by reducing her rate of time discounting and thus increasing
the present value of future interactions.  But under rational choice theory, an actor who wants to be
motivated by a concern for future considerations is, in fact, motivated by a concern for future
considerations.  In others words, someone who wants to be a cooperator is a cooperator.  But if
one lacks the motivation in the first instance, she cannot, by definition, be motivated to acquire it. 
In short, under the very theory that Cooter advances, the pareto self-improvement is a null set. 
Only cooperators can be motivated to undertake a pareto self-improvement and, as to them, the
transformation is unnecessary.67
Even taken on its own terms, the mechanism for internalization that is implicit in the work
of Becker and explicit in Cooter does not add significantly to the traditional account of the
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interaction in the Case of the Devoted Dog Lovers.  The Smiths did not internalize the new legal
proscription of the underlying norm because it conflicted with their deeply held values and
preferences.  Their obedience was commanded by the threat of external sanctions--the disapproval
of friends and neighbors.  To be sure, it is possible to surmise that the neighbors’ willingness to
enforce the social sanction was itself stimulated by an internalized preference for trees to dogs
where none previously had existed.  Or, in the alternative, the Smiths might over time internalize
the new norm.  Such a norm change could indeed have been produced by the legal rule, the
neighbors’ respect for law and/or their desire to appear as cooperative persons through their
allegiance to civic virtue as proclaimed by the state.  But of course it is equally plausible that none
of those things occurred.  Indeed, it is more likely that the neighbors preferred trees to dogs prior
to the enactment of the ordinance.  While the ordinance gave them information about what their
fellow citizens preferred, and may thus have emboldened them to act, it would not, under this
story, have led to a preference change.
  
In sum, the efforts of norms scholars and economic theorists to incorporate changing values
and preferences into the framework of rational choice theory remain problematic.  This is not to
say that there are no puzzles in life and in law that are better explained ex post by assuming
changes in endogenous preferences.  But the problem remains that theories of internalization and
expression turn on a much richer understanding of individual behavior in context than economic
analysis currently comprehends. Thus, the analyst who is searching for a preference-shaping
explanation of legal change is faced with a dilemma:  Either enrich rational choice theory with
context-specific variables that impair the theory’s capacity to generate testable hypotheses, or
create substantively empty concepts, such as the notion of pareto self-improvement.  The fact is
that behavioral science does not yet understand the mechanism of internalization.  Thus, attempts to
generalize and abstract from particular observations of internalized values or of changing
preferences are, at least under the current state of knowledge, unilluminating.
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IV.  TOWARD A NEW LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE CONSENSUS
Placing the Norms Debate in Perspective
Over the past decade, a number of law and economics scholars have sought to incorporate
endogenous social norms within the framework of rational choice analysis.  Their approaches have
varied.  Ellickson and other have treated norms as patterns of behavior that emerge from iterated
prisoner dilemma games among closely knit groups.68  Posner and others have treated norms as
signals of underlying character predispositions.69  Evolutionary game theorists have sought to
explain norms and conventions as equilibrium solutions to various coordination games.70  Finally,
McAdams, Becker and Cooter have sought to incorporate conceptions of status, other-regarding
behavior and self-motivated changes in character as part of an expressive71 and internalization72
theory of human behavior.
It is not surprising that a further step in this project has been the attempt to understand these
models within an institutional context, particularly the effects of legal rules on norms and
preferences.  That law can, in particular contexts, influence norms and preferences through changes
in social meaning is an insight from social theory that Lessig and Sunstein have introduced to legal
analysts.  Nevertheless, current attempts to generalize and systematize that observation within a
general theory have been unsuccessful.  General theories require parsimonious structures that can
Revised August 17, 2000
73 Nock, Comment on Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, supra note ---.
35
be applied across cultures and contexts.  But norms are highly context-sensitive.  Norms are both
specific and soft; that is, they apply to particular environments and populations and, even within
those constraints, normative meaning changes with particular circumstances.  As Steve Nock
points out, for example, the normative framework that defines what it means to be a man or a
woman in a marriage is not the same as what it means to be a man or a woman in church or in the
work place.73  Sociologists understand this problem well.  Society is a cluster of integrated and
overlapping institutions.  These institutions influence social roles and, in turn, social roles are
constituted by social norms.  Thus, from the perspective of a social science research design, the
effort to explain the relationship between law and social norms is deeply problematic.
The Limits of Behavioral Science
 This is not to say that we should abandon our exploration of the behavioral sciences just
because thick observations are not amenable to ready generalization.  Rather it means that we
should take the behavioral sciences on their own terms, as interesting and important observations
that may or may not apply in other contexts. The main criticism that one can level at the behavioral
theories of law and social norms is that they purport to know more about the world than they do
know.  Thus, to describe theories of expression and internalization as interesting and plausible
speculations is not to demean the ideas but rather to underscore their limits.
 Nevertheless, despite these constraints, legal analysts persist in using the behavioral
sciences in the service of legal argument.  The truth is that legal analysts have an instinct to
generalize the descriptive disciplines of sociology and psychology just as they have an instinct to
particularize the abstract discipline of economics.  Such is the occupational hazard of applied
social science analysis.  We consistently make the mistake of thinking of character, preferences
and techniques of decision-making as something unified and all-encompassing, that is, as
something provable as scientific fact.  Legal scholars reach for a dispositional explanation for
behaviors rather than a contextual explanation.  
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An instructive example of this bias is the recent popularity of legal applications of the
cognitive heuristic literature of a decade or so ago.74  When Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
published their influential work on “prospect theory” in the early 1980's,75 there was a rush of
legal analysts seeking real-world applications for the various biases in individual decision-making
that had been experimentally established.76  The emerging research in cognitive psychology was
integrated with the related work in behavioral economics by Richard Thaler, Hersh Shefrin and
others that sought to analyze individuals’ attempts through self-command to control or modify their
future choices.77  Within a short period of time, experimental concepts such as the endowment
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effect, “anchoring,” and the availability and representativeness biases became standard equipment
in the lexicon of legal scholars.  
But as the number of generalizable applications seemed to dwindle, the efforts to integrate
cognitive psychology and theories of inconsistent preferences within legal theory began to
diminish.  In the past several years, however, the same research has been redeployed under the
new name of “behavioral law and economics.”  A veritable flood of law review commentary has
once again elevated human error in making decisions under uncertainty as an appropriate topic for
legal analysis.78 
The new work in behavioral law and economics is interesting and suggestive.  Moreover,
many of the legal analysts who are focusing on these questions are appropriately cautious about the
degree to which behavioral approaches can be used as the basis for legal regulation.79  All of this is
to the good.  But a skeptic would also ask that the caution extend to generalizations about the state
of the science as well.80  As early as the 1980's, Ward Edwards, one of the pioneering researchers
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to study cognitive biases, began publicly to doubt the emerging applications of this work.  In an
important, and unfortunately overlooked, paper, Edwards reported research results that showed that
individuals who had access to simple “tools”--such as pencil and paper-- performed dramatically
better in the very experiments that had formed the foundation of the cognitive bias literature.81  In
the intervening decade, the work of Gird Gigerenzer and others have shown that a significant part of
the “error” in human judgment is attributable to the way the research design itself is framed.82  For
example, in Gigerenzer’s experiments, subjects are asked the same questions that were the basis for
the claim that individuals make consistent and predictable errors based on the availability and
representativeness heuristics.83  When the questions are framed in terms of probabilities (as in the
experiments of Kahneman and Tversky), the biases are consistent with previous research results. 
But, if instead of using probabilities, the same questions are asked as frequencies, the error is
dramatically reduced.84  These results suggest that humans do have inductive-reasoning capabilities
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locations rather than arbitrary parsings of objects.( “For instance, apples should be easier to count than four inch
square pieces of bark on the tree trunk” )See Gary L. Brase, Leda Cosmides, & John Tooby, Individuation,
Counting, and Statistical Inference: The Role of Frequency and Whole-Object Representations in Judgment
Under Uncertainty, 127 J. Exper. Psych. 3 (1998). 
87 The debate continues.  In a recent paper, Kahneman and Tversky responded to Gigerenzer’s critique as
being a caricature of their basic argument. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Reality of Cognitive
Illusion, 103 Psych. Rev. 582 (1996).  In reply, Gigerenzer repeated his claim that frequencies make cognitive
“errors” largely disappear and reiterated his main point as follows: 
The important issue that divides us is research strategy.  Kahneman and Tversky’s (critique) ended with an
appeal for “building on the notions of representativeness, availability, and anchoring.”  In the same breath
they denied the need for constructing process models and specifying the conditions under which different
heuristics work.  What sort of “building” can occur without first daring to be precise?  As I see it, there
are two ways in which a theory can fail: by being wrong or by being indeterminate.  The latter may be
worse for scientific progress, because indeterminate theories resist attempts to prove, disprove, or even
improve them.  Twenty-five years ago, extending on Ward Edward’s work, Kahneman and Tversky opened
up a fertile field.  Now it is time to plant theories.”
 Gerd Gigerenzer, On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics: A Reply to Kahneman and Tversky, 103 Psych.
Rev. 592, 596 ( 1996).
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that track with traditional notions of rationality, but that the evolutionary design of those
mechanisms requires the use of event frequencies to function properly.85  Gigerenzer concludes that
rules of thumb or heuristics do exist in human decision making, but rather than demonstrating the
general predisposition of humans to err, they establish, to the contrary, how capable humans are in
making efficient decisions under uncertainty.86
What lessons can we learn from the ongoing academic debate among cognitive
psychologists over the existence and extent of cognitive “errors?”87  This story is a further
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90 Gladwell, The Tipping Point, supra note -- at 163.
40
illustration of how important is for legal scholars to appreciate the limits of behavioral science.  
The instinct of legal academics to generalize from emerging social science data risks having the
analyst herself commit a fundamental cognitive error --known to social scientists as the
“fundamental attribution error” (FAE).88  The FAE results from the experimentally observed
tendency of humans to make the mistake of overestimating the importance of fundamental human
character traits and underestimating the importance of situation and context.89  Thus, analysts may
have been too quick to assume that cognitive heuristics and biases are dispositional rather than
contextual as the work of Gigerenzer and others seems to demonstrate.
  
A similar tendency to assume that traits of character--such as honesty, truthfulness and
trustworthiness--are immutable or inherent pervades the work of the “norms scholars” of the past
decade. As Malcolm Gladwell points out,
 “character isn’t...a stable, easily identifiable set of closely related traits.  It only seems that
way because of a glitch in the way our brains are organized.  Character is more like a
bundle of habits and tendencies and interests, loosely bound together and dependent, at
certain times, on circumstance and context.  The reason that most of us seem to have a
consistent character is that most of us are really good at controlling our environment.” 90
There are a number of reasons why legal scholars, including those disposed to be
suspicious of the abstractions of rational choice theory, have nonetheless ignored the limits of
behavioral science in their effort to incorporate human fallibility as well as endogenous
preferences within a rational choice framework.  For starters, legal scholarship is also a
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generalizing methodology.  The legal analyst uses analogical reasoning to suggest that if A is
sufficiently similar to B, then A should be regulated in the same way as B.  This approach requires
identifying salient characteristics and ignoring extraneous detail.  Moreover, the core technique of
legal analysis is to frame all legal consequences in binary terms.  Thus, either A is like B or it isn’t. 
These techniques inculcate an instinct in the analyst for separating the important from the
extraneous.  The behavioral sciences, on the other hand, are enveloping.  Often it is the collection
of detail that allows patterns and structures to appear.  Thus, the observational sciences depend on
the detail for nuance and insight.
Moreover, there is an inherent bias in legal scholarship toward methodologies that support
legal interventions into private behavior.  This bias does not depend upon the claim that most legal
scholars have political views that lead them to prefer governmental to market-based solutions to
collective action problems.  Rather, it is an observation based upon the political economy of the
academic marketplace.  Law professors, as a group, enhance their importance relative to other
academic disciplines in direct relation to the frequency with which legal solutions to social
problems can be seen as superior to alternative solutions premised on insights from political
science, economics or social theory.91
Whatever the reasons, it is important for legal academics to appreciate the biases inherent
in their discipline and work to correct for them.  As an applied discipline, law is dependent on the
tools of primary disciplines for both the positive and normative claims that it makes about real
world phenomena.  It is perhaps understandable that legal analysts should try to mix economics and
behavioral sciences to produce stronger legal arguments.  But, in fact, a wrench grafted on a
hammer is not a better wrench or a better hammer, but simply an unwieldy tool.  Far better would
be the instinct of the next generation of legal scholars to strive to become polymaths.  Rational
choice theory is useful for certain purposes and any legal scholar who purports to make claims
about large scale effects of legal rules should have a basic competence in deploying these
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techniques.  Similarly, the research methodologies of psychology and sociology are useful in
enriching our understanding of the underlying behaviors that are regulated by those same legal rules. 
While this context may not always be amenable to generalization, deep familiarity with particular
context is the best medicine for any legal analyst who strives for general theory.92
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V.  CONCLUSION
Law incorporates both the general and the particular.  One function of law is to generalize
across contexts.  Thus, notions of horizontal equity --of treating like cases alike--run through both
public and private law inquiries.  But law is also particular and context-specific.  The metaphor of
the exceptions to the rule ultimately consuming the rule is but one manifestation of the notion that
legal commands are sensitive to their environment.  Indeed, the common law method itself
illustrates the parallel processes of generalization and particularization.  Out of the particular facts
and circumstances of a single dispute emerges a rule that is then generalized in its application to
other, similar circumstances.  In deciding whether the rule applies to another case, the common law
method requires a further inquiry into the particular circumstances of the new dispute in order to
determine whether the necessary salience exists to support generalization of the rule.
As a consequence, academic lawyers, more than any other academic discipline, need to be
mindful of the paradox of context which lies at the heart of the binary choice between the desert and
the swamp so pungently identified a generation ago by Arthur Leff.  Without context no legal rule
can be applied, but with nothing but context no legal rule can be found.  Accommodating this
paradox is the central challenge for legal scholars today.  This essay has analyzed recent efforts to
enrich rational choice theory through the incorporation of endogenous preferences derived from
social norms.  Those efforts have been frustrated thus far by the heroic but ultimately fatal step of
trying to graft the complex and highly individualized process by which values and preferences are
created and modified onto a formal analytical framework.  A more profitable approach, I have
suggested, is to deploy rational choice analysis on its own terms, but retain (as part of the analyst’s
frame of judgment) the situation sense of context-specific knowledge as an antidote to inapposite
analogies and generalizations.  As legal scholars, we are in the uncomfortable middle ground
between the general and the particular.  Law, as applied behavioral theory, strives to generalize
from real-world observations in order to implement socially desirable changes in real-world
behaviors.  Inevitably, this requires the legal analyst to generalize uncomfortably from the
particular observations of the behavioral sciences and to particularize with equal discomfort the
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abstractions of economics.
In any case, the norms scholars whose work I have examined deserve credit for asking the
key question: what are the mechanisms by which law influences behavior apart from the deterrent
effect of state sanctions?  That question remains a fertile area for further investigation.  Legal
analysts can and should continue to deploy all the social sciences in service of testable hypotheses
that explain the linkages between legal and normative constraints and between external and internal
explanations of human behavior.  A traditional rational choice focus on the incentive effects of legal
regulation offers a parsimonious explanation of the interactions among law, norms and values,
though it fails to explain key phenomena that we can observe in the world.  Treating preferences,
values and norms as endogenous variables promises, at first blush, to offer a more robust
explanation for the changes in behavior that are stimulated by legal rules.  But we currently lack a
persuasive explanation of the mechanics by which norms evolve and are modified by law, or of the
process by which values are internalized.  As a consequence, we lack as well the knowledge of
which phenomena are as yet unknown and which are simply unknowable.
